Sep 15, 2026
Probability rose from 2.6% to 11.3% — a 8.7-point move over the past day.
Prediction markets price the chance of Russia seizing the Dovha Balka intersection by September 30 at 11.5%. That probability is unlikely, tethered to the ISW map’s depiction of Russian control over a precise set of coordinates.
Will Russia capture Dovha Balka by September 30?
Updated · Volume $130.5K
| Outcome | Probability | 24h |
|---|---|---|
| Will Russia capture Dovha Balka by September 30? | 11.5% | +0.3 |
| Will Russia capture Dovha Balka by April 30? | 0.0% | 0.0 |
| Will Russia capture Dovha Balka by June 30? | 0.0% | 0.0 |
| Will Russia capture Dovha Balka by May 31? | 0.0% | 0.0 |
The September 30 deadline is the focus of trading, with the other listed scenarios all regarded as long shots.
Sep 15, 2026
Probability rose from 2.6% to 11.3% — a 8.7-point move over the past day.
Sep 14, 2026
Probability rose from 3.3% to 9.8% — a 6.5-point move over the past day.
Sep 13, 2026
Probability fell from 11.0% to 3.3% — a 7.7-point move over the past day.
Sep 12, 2026
Probability fell from 11.5% to 3.5% — a 8.0-point move over the past day.
Sep 8, 2026
Probability fell from 21.0% to 10.0% — a 11.0-point move over the past day.
Sep 7, 2026
Probability rose from 18.5% to 22.0% — a 3.5-point move over the past day.
Sep 6, 2026
Probability fell from 23.5% to 18.5% — a 5.0-point move over the past day.
Sep 5, 2026
Probability rose from 19.0% to 23.5% — a 4.5-point move over the past day.
Sep 4, 2026
Probability fell from 20.5% to 15.5% — a 5.0-point move over the past day.
Sep 3, 2026
Probability fell from 28.5% to 18.5% — a 10.0-point move over the past day.
The market now sits at 11.5%, after ranging from 2.6% to 47.0% over the period. The contract resolves to “Yes” if, by 11:59 PM ET on the specified date, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) map shades any part of the intersection at 48.492703° N, 37.607318° E in red — designating it as “Assessed Russian Control,” “Assessed Russian Advance,” or “Assessed Russian Gains.” Crucially, the shading must persist through the next full ISW daily update cycle; single-day flickers or glitches do not count. “Assessed Russian Infiltration Areas” are explicitly excluded. If Russia gains actual control of the location as part of a negotiated settlement, that too triggers a “Yes,” regardless of the ISW map. Should the ISW map become permanently unavailable, DeepStateMap serves as the backup, with credible reporting as a last resort. The main driver is the approach of the Oct 1, 2026 deadline, combined with each new ISW map release. Any update showing the intersection under sustained Russian control would quickly shift the odds. Conversely, the absence of such shading as the deadline nears would weigh on the price. Temporary mapping anomalies are explicitly disregarded by the market’s rules.
It means the ISW map shows red shading over any part of the intersection at 48.492703° N, 37.607318° E by the resolution date, with the shading lasting through the next full ISW update cycle.
DeepStateMap becomes the primary source. If both are permanently unavailable, a consensus of credible reporting is used. Temporary glitches or errors are ignored.
Yes — if Russia establishes actual control over the intersection as a result of a settlement, the market resolves to “Yes” even if the ISW map does not shade it. An announcement alone is not enough.
No. Any subsequent loss of control after the first capture is explicitly ignored; the market stays resolved as “Yes.”
Data: Polymarket · Methodology · Not financial advice